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ABSTRACT
Issues of pre-award and post-award interest are an important
component of quantum awards that typically receive little attention.
While there is a set of alternatives that are commonly advocated,
there is not an agreement on a systematic approach for determining
the correct interest rate. In this Article, we argue that economic
principles can be used to develop a framework for guiding tribunals.
This framework proposes economically appropriate alternatives
based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the contract, treaty, or law
at issue.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Questions surrounding interest rates arise in most cases where
damages are awarded. International arbitration tribunals typically
calculate damages based on when the incident occurred, and then add
“pre-award” and “post-award” interest. The interest rate applied can
have a significant impact on damages, especially for pre-award
interest, given the potential length of the arbitration process.1 For
example, if it takes five years for a claimant to secure an award, a
10% pre-award interest rate would raise a US$100 million claim by
60% to US$160 million,2 and the interest would represent 37.5% of
the total damages awarded.
This example is not just a hypothetical. In a recent case
involving Tenaris S.A., a company incorporated in Luxembourg, and
the country of Venezuela, principal damages amounted to US$87.3
million, and pre-award interest totaled US$85.5 million, or close to
50% of the total damages awarded.3 Similarly, in another case
involving the export of tobacco products and the country of Mexico,
principal damages totaled Mex$9.5 million, and pre-award interest
was Mex$7.5 million, or 44% per cent of the total award.4 Finally, in

1. LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Costs and Duration: 2013-2016,
at 8, https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/LCIAFacts-and-Figures-Costs-and-Duration-2013-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HP8S-KSJ3]
(archived May 8, 2018).
2. This figure assumes that interest is compounded annually. More frequent
compounding would increase the interest amount even further.
3. Tenaris S.A. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7098.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4V5REPL] (archived May 8, 2018).
4. James Dow, Interest, in THE GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
(John A. Trenor ed. 2016).
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cases ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15 pre-award interest actually
exceeded the principal amount of damages to which it was applied.5
Despite their practical importance, interest rates are rarely a
major focus of parties and tribunals when pleading and granting
awards. While interest is important from an economic perspective,
many tribunals give little consideration to this issue.6 As a result, preaward interest is an under-pleaded area, and there are significant
differences in the approaches used by parties and tribunals.7
Recent research confirms these findings. A study by Professor
James Dow from the London Business School8 demonstrates that
tribunals select a variety of interest rates for awards. This includes US
Treasury bills and London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), with
and without a premium (also known as “spread”).9
The Dow study also shows that tribunals give diverse
justifications for the choice of rates.10 In some cases, it appears that
respondents simply failed to challenge the specific claim for preaward interest, so the tribunals adopted the claimants’ requests.11
Some tribunals have justified the use of risk-free and interbank rates
as appropriate to compensate claimants; in other cases, the awards
refer to specific rates contained in the relevant treaties.12

5. Kardassopoulos & Fuchs v. Republic of Geor., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 &
ARB/07/15, Award (Mar. 3, 2010).
6. An Unexpected Interest in Interest, GLOB. ARB. REV. (May 12, 2015), http://
globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034451/an-unexpected-interest-in-interest
[https://perma.cc/QM2J-2LX3] (archived May 8, 2018).
7. Id.
8. Professor Dow is also an academic advisor to The Brattle Group. BRATTLE GRP.,
James Dow, http://www.brattle.com/experts/james-dow [https://perma.cc/29WG-T9W8]
(archived on Mar. 28, 2018).
9. See An Unexpected Interest in Interest, supra note 6. The study shows that in 23 of the
60 cases analyzed, pre-award interest was calculated on the market benchmark plus a premium
such as, for example LIBOR plus 1% or US Treasury bills (T-bills) plus 2%. In 14 cases,
Professor Dow found that the tribunal simply stated a rate (such as 4.5% or 9%). In the
remaining 23 cases, pre-award interest was a base rate, but without any spread. The study also
showed that the adders or spreads vary significantly across awards. For example, no spread
was added in 5 of the 21 cases based on LIBOR, 2% was added in 9 cases, 4% in 4 cases and
1% in 2 cases. In one case the spread was based on “political risk.” Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) reached similar conclusions in a
2016 study.13 In 60% of the awards analyzed, the tribunal did not
explicitly address the reasons behind interest awarded, while the
explanations for the other 40% were diverse.14 They include the
application of a contractual and/or statutory rate, or a desire to
compensate the claimant by offering a rate commensurate with its
borrowing costs, or by offering a reasonable return on investment.15
The PwC study also notes that tribunals generally do not distinguish
between pre- and post-award interest rates.16 When the distinction is
addressed explicitly, tribunals have expressed very different views.17
In some cases, tribunals have taken the view that pre- and post-award
interest should be calculated using the same methodology – while in
other cases, tribunals have stated that pre- and post-award interest
should be treated differently.18
Like Professor Dow, the authors of the PwC study found that
tribunals appear to be aware of issues related to the money currency
of the award.19 This does not mean, however, that tribunals follow a
unified approach.20 The PwC study notes that some tribunals
explicitly recognized that the interest rate should match the currency
of the award, while others felt that this was not necessary.21
The two aforementioned studies suggest that the economics
behind the choice of interest rate in awards are not well understood.
In the next section of this Article, we will propose a principles-based,
economic framework for choosing the appropriate pre- and postaward interest rates. This framework can be implemented by
tribunals, parties, and experts.

13. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Dispute Perspective: Tribunals’ Conflicts on
Interest (2016), https://www.pwc.co.uk/tax/assets/tribunals-conflicts-on-interest-new.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EUL2-YM7B] (archived May 8, 2018).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING INTEREST RATES
The framework we develop to select pre- and post-award interest
rates reflects economic principles and provides fair compensation. By
“fair compensation,” we refer to an interest rate that is market-based,
that compensates for the risks that the tribunal chooses to recognize,
and that preserves the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the award. Our
proposed framework encompasses two fundamental concepts. First,
the relevant valuation standard is FMV – the rate consistent with
well-functioning markets for arm’s-length transactions between well
informed parties. Second, the interest awarded should address two of
the most basic concepts in finance: the time value of money and the
risk of the cash flows at issue.22 Our approach is consistent with and
accomplishes other policy objectives at times cited in the relevant
literature, including: 1) signaling the social obligation to honor
contracts, 2) preventing unjust enrichment, and 3) avoiding incentives
by either side to benefit by delaying payment.23
To motivate a company to extend a loan, the loan must generate
a return at least as high as that available on a riskless asset – say a
guaranteed bank deposit or a US Treasury bill. Such a rate
compensates for the time value of money during the delay in receipt
of payment – here, the delay from the date of valuation to the date of
award. Interest rates must also provide compensation for bearing the
risk of default by the debtor, and for the risk that interest rates will
rise during the lending period above the level expected when the debt
is issued.24 Lenders would not willingly extend credit without such
compensation, since short-term and risk-free alternatives would be
superior. All of these factors should be considered in determining the
appropriate pre- and post-award interest rate.

22. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 21, 24 (10th ed. 2011); RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 48, § 6.1.
23. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293,
295-98 (1996). Punishing the wrongdoer is also sometimes listed as a policy objective. Our
approach does not include a punitive element, but it does establish a market benchmark, in the
sense that imposing a higher rate can be seen as including a punitive element.
24. This latter component, called interest rate risk, arises from variation in the two
components of nominal interest rates: inflation and the real interest rate. Over the course of a
long-term loan, both can be higher or lower than expectations held by market participants at
loan inception. See also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 53-64 (10th ed. 2011) (providing
an economic discussion of interest rates).
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Prevailing Theories of Pre-Award Interest

Scholars and practitioners have proposed three main approaches
to pre-award interest. Each approach implies a different rate. As we
discuss below, the “forced loan theory” proposes the respondent’s
cost of borrowing. A second theory advocates for a risk-free rate (the
“risk-free rate theory”). A third strand of theories proposes some
measure of the claimant’s cost of financing.25
The “forced” or “coerced” loan theory argues that the correct
rate is the respondent’s borrowing rate, in effect treating the claimant
as a “forced creditor” of the respondent. 26 The key argument under
this theory is that compensation was due at the date of the breach.
Since compensation was due, but not paid, at that date, the claimant
bore the risk of the respondent’s default, just like other creditors who
may have extended loans on a voluntary commercial basis at the date
of the breach.27 Under this approach, the respondent effectively owes
a fixed amount as of the date of the breach, and the failure to pay
immediate compensation is the equivalent of borrowing money from
the claimant. The argument is that claimants deserve compensation
commensurate with other unsecured lenders to the respondent, at the
respondent’s unsecured borrowing rate.28
An alternative theory argues that courts and arbitration tribunals
should apply the risk-free rate (the “risk-free rate” theory) since there
is no risk of default at the time the award is issued.29 The key contrast
with the forced loan theory is that here proponents view the liability
25. See INGMAR MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW § 6.B.1, Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3, &
Appendix 4 (2d ed. 2017) (listing interest rates for ICSID cases, NAFTA cases, Energy
Charter cases, and ad hoc deliberations, respectively).
26. See Roy J. Epstein, Prejudgment Interest Rates in Patent Cases: Don’t Compound an
Error, 24 (2) IPL. Newsl. (2006), at 9.
27. James M. Patell, Roman L. Weil & Mark A. Wolfson, Accumulating Damages in
Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 343 (1982).
28. Jeffrey M. Colón & Michael S. Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, in LITIGATION
SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT § 16.4 (Roman L. Weil et al.,
eds., 6th ed., 2017). See also Robert L. Losey, Michael Mass & Jingsan Li, Prejudgment
Interest: The Long and the Short of It, 15 J. FORENSIC ECON. 59 (2002); Jeffrey M. Colón &
Michael S. Knoll, Prejudgment Interest in International Arbitration (2007); Faculty
Scholarship
Paper
185,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/185
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4035-34625-40301-40679] (archived May 8, 2018).
29. See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and the Theory
of Damages, 5 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 145 (1990).
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as arising at the moment of the award, at which time the respondent
presumably is not in default on its general commercial obligations.30
To the extent that claimant has been exposed to risks between the
breach and award dates, the risk-free rate theory categorizes them as
general litigation risks, rather than financial risks that arose at the date
of breach.31 Proponents of the theory have appealed to two aspects of
the US legal system: the presumption of innocence prior to verdict,
and the general rule that each side bears its own legal costs.32 Under
this theory, then, the risk that a respondent fails financially prior to an
award is viewed as a litigation risk rather than a financial risk. For
example:
The risk of the defendant’s bankruptcy is not the only risk the
plaintiff bears. It also bears the risk of losing the case . . . . [T]he
risk that the defendant will go bankrupt during trial is properly
associated with the risks of litigation, not with the violation itself.
It is hard to see why that risk should be singled out as one for
which the plaintiff is to be compensated. Accordingly, we retain
the position that prejudgment interest should be awarded at the
risk-free rate.33

Under this view, awarding any higher rate would constitute an
abuse of hindsight, in effect compensating the claimant for an
investment that was never undertaken. That is, given that the
respondent is solvent at the time of the award and that it did not owe a
debt to the claimant before then, the claimant should not be entitled to
a premium for past default risk that it did not bear.34 The theory is
economically coherent, but if the tribunal viewed the debt as arising at
the time of the breach itself, as opposed to the date of the award, the
conclusions would be reversed.
Moreover, a tribunal could still endorse the forced loan theory
while accepting the view of pre-award interest as part of the category
of general legal expenses. Some jurisdictions differ markedly from
the US system, and award litigation expenses to claimants who
prevail. Claimants could argue that the forced loan theory accurately

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See, e.g., id.
See id. at 147-148.
Id.
Id. at 147-48 (discussing the issue within the context of the US legal system).
See id. at 146.
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reflects a cost that they bore in connection with the protracted nature
of the dispute.
It is worth emphasizing that, while the forced loan theory uses
the word “forced,” it does not include a punitive element in the preaward interest rate. The forced loan theory implies a fair market rate,
reflecting the FMV principle, i.e., the rate at which lenders would
agree to lend to the respondent in arm’s-length commercial
transactions. We are aware of one case in which the tribunal rejected
the forced loan theory because it associated the word “forced” with a
desire to punish the respondent, even though the tribunal viewed
prejudgment interest as an instrument to compensate the claimant for
the postponement of compensation that had become due many years
in the past. The tribunal was also willing to compensate the claimant
for litigation expenses, so there was no appeal to the notion that
litigants should bear their own costs. The relevant legal framework
called for a commercial rate, and the tribunal thought that responding
to an image of a loan as “forced” would stray from the requirement to
rely on normal commercial terms. However, the word “forced” was,
in that case, just an unfortunate term for a principle that directly
appealed to rates set in the market by willing lenders and the
respondent.
We conclude that the same basic principle applies to both the
forced loan and the risk-free rate theories. That is, that pre-award
interest should reflect risk at the market rate. The difference between
them lies in the tribunal’s approach to the prior risk of financial
insolvency or default of the respondent.35
A separate strand of theories views pre-award interest as an issue
related to the claimant’s cost of funds.36 The argument is frequently
made along the lines best illustrated with a simple hypothetical
example: the claimant borrowed from a bank to finance the purchase
price of an asset that was expropriated shortly afterwards. In the
absence of the expropriation, the loan would have carried an interest
rate commensurate with the risk of the underlying asset. If the
35. We note that there is no tension between the requirement in some treaties or
contracts for the use of a “commercial” rate of interest and the use of a risk-free rate. The riskfree rate is itself a commercial rate for securities without default risk. It is set in free markets
by commercial parties and investors transacting freely. In other words, it defines the
commercial rate for lending and borrowing risk-free amounts.
36. MARBOE, supra note 26, § 6.B.1.
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claimant did not repay the bank immediately upon expropriation, the
loan would have continued to accrue interest until the receipt of
compensation from the respondent. If the respondent’s borrowing rate
is lower than the interest rate on the underlying asset loan, then the
argument is that either a risk-free rate or the forced loan theory would
impose a loss upon the claimant, failing to cover the loan costs prior
to the award.
A different, but related, argument is that claimants had to borrow
to replace the lost funds in order to make profitable investments.
Claimants, at times, argue that pre-award interest should cover the
interest paid on incremental sums that they borrowed in the absence
of prompt compensation from the respondent. The argument here is
that the claimants would have borrowed less in the absence of the
disputed conduct. A generalized form of the argument considers not
just the loans undertaken by the claimant, but also the cost of raising
equity funds, which together combine to form the claimant’s overall
cost of capital (or weighted average cost of capital—WACC). The
argument is then that the principle of full compensation or full
reparation requires the calculation of pre-award interest based on the
claimant’s cost of capital,37 to put the claimant in the position it
would have achieved absent the breach.38
We explain below why a uniform appeal to the claimant’s cost
of borrowing or its cost of capital is not consistent with economic
principles. We also explain why the arguments advanced by
proponents of this approach may reflect case-specific circumstances
rather than general principles. Our view is that a tribunal could
address such circumstances directly as a distinct element of damages,
as opposed to indirectly through the pre-award interest rate.
B.

Implementation of the Framework for Pre-Award Interest

Our framework consists of four steps, guided by the principle
that matching risk to return should inform the specific choice of rate.
37. The principle of full compensation or full reparation is to “wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act” and it is usually referred to as the Chorzów Standard. See
Germ. v. Pol., PCIJ Case No. 17 (Sept. 13, 1928), http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/
decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm [https://perma.cc/4WTJ-MGLJ] (archived May 8, 2018).
38. See, e.g., Manuel A. Abdala, Pablo D. López Zadicoff & Pablo T. Spiller, Invalid
Round Trips in Setting Pre-Judgment Interest in International Arbitration, 5 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REV. 1 (2011).
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Our approach follows the FMV standard in that the selected rate
would be consistent with well-functioning markets for arm’s-length
transactions between well informed parties, subject to the risks that
are deemed legally compensable.
Figure 1 summarizes the steps:
Figure 1: Steps to Determine Pre-Award Interest Rate

1. Step # 1: Allocate Default Risk
First, the tribunal decides if the risk of the respondent’s default
prior to an award is relevant and compensable to the claimant. If it is
not, then the pre-award interest should be calculated at the risk-free
rate. This would be consistent with the risk-free rate theory that there
was no debt until the award was issued, at which point there is no
chance of past default if the respondent is present and solvent. Here,
then, the only compensation needed for the claimant is the time value
of money between the date of valuation and the date of the award.
If the tribunal decides that the claimant deserves compensation
for the risk of the respondent’s default prior to an award, then preaward interest should reflect the respondent’s borrowing rate for
liabilities of the same risk. Using the respondent’s borrowing rate is
consistent with the forced loan theory discussed above.39 Proponents
of this theory argue that while we cannot possibly know how the
proceeds would have been invested if the plaintiff had received them
earlier, we do not know how they were actually invested, because

39. It may seem counterintuitive that the claimant should be compensated for having
borne the default risk - even though at the award date, it is known that the respondent is not
insolvent. It is, however, no different from any lending arrangement in which the loan rate
reflects borrower’s default risk and the borrower pays that rate, even though it never defaults.
The risk premium is the compensation necessary to induce the lender to loan in the first place.
Without it, a willing transaction would not occur.
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they were advanced to the defendant in the form of a forced loan. 40
Thus, to award less than the respondent’s borrowing rate would fail to
compensate the claimant for risks it was indeed forced to bear.
Conversely, to award more would compensate a claimant for greater
risks than it was forced to bear.
Awarding pre-award interest at the respondent’s borrowing rate
does not imply straying from a focus on the claimant and how it was
affected by the delay.41 If payment became due on the date of the
breach, then the payment delay caused the claimant to bear the
respondent’s risk of default. Awarding interest at a rate commensurate
with the risk provides fair market compensation for the effect on
claimant’s financial position. It also prevents unjust enrichment of the
respondent, as commentators have noted,42 but that is not its only
economic result.
Using either the risk-free rate or the respondent’s borrowing rate
would be consistent with the principles of market-based rates of
addressing the risks deemed legally compensable and preserving
FMV across time. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.
Suppose that a tribunal has ruled in favor of the claimant on the
breach/valuation date, and granted it an award worth US$100 on that
date (i.e., assuming an instantaneous ruling from the tribunal).
Suppose that the tribunal orders the respondent to offer two
alternatives for payment: (1) immediately hand over a two-year US
Treasury security with a face value (or principal amount) of US$100
that pays a risk-free market rate of 3% per year43 or (2) a promissory
note issued by the respondent for the same US$100 in principal
amount with an interest rate of 5%, maturing in two years’ time.
Assume further that the higher rate of 5% is the market interest rate
applicable on the respondent’s other debt, and compensates for the
chance that the respondent might default before maturity of the debt.
The FMV of either alternative on the valuation date is US$100,
and would represent full compensation if given at the date of breach,
40. See Knoll, supra note 24, at 310-11.
41. See MARBOE, supra note 26, ¶¶ 6.110-111.
42. Id. ¶ 6.111; see also Knoll, supra note 24, at 310-11 (explaining that in the generic
commercial litigation context, the defendant’s borrowing rate both compensates the plaintiff
and prevents the unjust enrichment of the defendant).
43. For simplicity, we assume that this US Treasury security is trading at par (i.e., at its
face value of US$100), on the valuation date.
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just as payment of US$100 in cash would. To see this, consider that in
principle, the claimant could sell the two-year US Treasury security to
a third party for the US$100 amount of the award. It could also sell
the respondent’s two-year promissory note for the same amount.
Potential purchasers would value the note just like any other future
payments owed by the respondent.
Of course, in practice tribunals do not rule instantaneously; it
takes time to secure an award. Thus, in reality, the tribunal has to
decide whether to compensate the claimant for the risk of default
between the date of breach and the date of the award. If the tribunal
decides that it should not, then the tribunal should award interest
based on a risk-free rate, otherwise it is appropriate to apply the
respondent’s borrowing rate. In either case the selected rate
compensates the claimant for the risks that the tribunal chooses to
recognize. In this illustration, the 3% in the US Treasury44
compensates solely for the time value of money, while the 5% in the
promissory note compensates as well for the risk of the respondent’s
default.45
2. Step # 2: Ensure that Interest Rate Matches Currency of the
Award
Tribunals should ensure that the interest rate matches the
currency of the award. Interest rates reflect inflation and exchange
rate expectations that are currency-specific. Therefore, the rate used
should be based on market rates in the currency in which the award is
denominated,46 as it is not economically meaningful to apply rates
quoted in one currency to amounts denominated in a different
currency.47
44. Again, assuming the US government’s risk of default is zero, the 3% compensates
the claimant for the time value of money.
45. We abstracted in this example from issues related to interest rate risk, which are
addressed in § II.B.2 of the framework.
46. Note that the award thus calculated can then be paid in any freely traded currency
using the market exchange rate at the time of payment.
47. See Colón & Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, supra note 30, at 18-21 (providing a
detailed discussion of currency conversion in the context of pre-award interest, as well as the
need for matching the interest rate to the award currency). See also Dow, supra note 4 (noting
that arbitration tribunals are generally aware of the issue and choose the currency of interest
rates appropriately). See generally MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION:
COMPENSATION STANDARDS, VALUATION METHODS, AND EXPERT EVIDENCE § 9.2 (2008).
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However, matching the interest rate currency with the award
currency does not make the choice of the award currency itself
irrelevant. An award calculated in US dollars that carries a US dollar
interest would not, in general, result in the same amount at the time
of payment as if it were calculated in, say, euros (carrying a euro
interest rate) and then converted to US dollars. The choice of the
award currency is important, but it is a separate question from preaward interest.48
3. Step # 3: Select Rate Based on Maturity Consistent with Relevant
Risks
The next step is for the tribunal to select the benchmark rate
consistent with its allocation of risk,49 while taking into account
maturity and length of compensation. Markets generally require
higher rates for lending or borrowing over a longer period of time.
Again, reflecting a core principle of finance, higher rates for longer
maturities compensate lenders or investors for bearing risks arising
from the irreversible commitment of funds. For fixed-rate debt,
lenders bear risks that include unexpected changes in inflation, real
interest rates, and borrower’s default risk.50
It may seem natural to set pre-award interest using long-term
rates, reflecting the time elapsed between breach and award dates, in
order to provide compensation for these risks. If the selected longterm rate is commensurate with market rates, such selection would
compensate the claimant for these risks, but it would also force the
claimant to bear them. Perhaps we could all agree that a five-year
fixed interest rate at the time of the breach would prove too low and
“out-of-market” by the end of the fifth year (assuming that it takes
five years to receive an award) if either inflation or real interest rates
increased shortly after the breach, or the respondent’s solvency
deteriorates. In other words, a fixed long-term rate is not consistent
48. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW § 10.1 (2008) (providing legal considerations regarding the choice of
currency for awards in investment arbitration).
49. That is, the risk-free rate or respondent’s borrowing rate.
50. Long-term rates can be higher than short-term rates also because investors expect
short-term interest rates to rise over time. However, that alone cannot explain why long-term
rates are much more frequently above short-term rates than below. See BREALEY ET AL., supra
note 25, at 58.
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with the risk-free rate approach, because long-term rates, even on
instruments with no default risk, are not truly risk-free, due to interest
rate risk exposure. Simply using the rate for a security at the time of
the breach whose maturity matches the award date compensates the
claimant based on market expectations and risk preferences at the
time of the breach, but leaves that claimant exposed to potential gains
or losses from changing circumstances.
An alternative view is that the tribunal should apply a series of
rolling short-term rates to protect the claimant from the risks of
fluctuations in inflation, real interest rates, and of changes in
respondent’s default risk that may have occurred after the date of
breach,51 if default risk is deemed compensable in Step 1. Exposure to
interest rate risk is not inherently part of the forced nature of the loan.
This is because if the claimant and the respondent negotiated an
arm’s-length loan at the date of the breach, claimant could avoid
interest rate risk exposure by structuring the loan with a floating rate
that tracks changes in short-term interest rates.52
The potential disadvantage of using rolling short-term rates is
that it does not address the long-term commitment of funds. A
claimant could in principle still claim that it deserves a premium to
address the commitment of funds over an extended period of years.
Rolling short-term rates forward over time offers certain types of
protection, but it does not address illiquidity risk, which cannot be
avoided if the claimant is unable to sell or borrow against an eventual
award when it faces an unexpected need for cash. Such a premium,
however, would be small because commercial entities not in financial
distress, which are often the claimants in international arbitration
cases, have access to financial markets that allow them to meet
unexpected liquidity needs. As we discuss in Step 4 below, if special
circumstances cause a claimant to suffer harm from being unable to
access funds, such harm can be calculated and awarded separately as
damages. A related, but distinct liquidity premium for long-term
commitments can arise if short-term rates do not fully reflect the risk
51. Note that to eliminate exposure to changes in respondent’s default risk, the premium
for default risk should be time-varying. In practice, the credit default spread (CDS) market can
provide timely information about changes in default risk. See Knoll, supra note 24, at 324-26
(proposing the alternative of a floating base rate plus a fixed default risk premium, which locks
in the expected risk of respondent’s default at the time of the breach.
52. See id.
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of default on a long-term loan because of lack of liquidity as a
borrower approaches insolvency and default.53
Applying a rolling short-term rate can result in either a higher or
a lower cumulative interest amount, as opposed to applying the longterm rate over the same period.54 Both approaches appeal to
underlying principles and match risk and return, but it is clear that the
claimant or respondent may prefer one or the other knowing in
hindsight which approach is most advantageous. The appropriate
answer depends on the risks that claimant is forced to bear and that
the tribunal believes it should recognize. Rolling short-term rates can
insulate the claimants from the risk of subsequent spikes in rates, but
does not provide compensation for forgoing access to the funds for a
long period. A tribunal can compensate the claimant for this lack of
liquidity by adopting a fixed, long-term interest rate at the date of
breach, but such an approach exposes the claimant to the risk of
subsequent movements in interest rates, including changes in
respondent’s default risk under the forced loan theory.
If default risk is deemed compensable, a practical solution may
involve using a rolling short-term risk-free rate, such as the Treasury
bill rate for US dollars amounts and add a credit risk premium
measured based on market instruments. These could include credit
default swaps or bonds, with a longer maturity. This would, in effect,
provide a premium that can compensate for illiquidity effects arising
from the long-term nature of the commitment, while still protecting
the claimant from risk of changes in interest rates and likelihood of
default.
If the tribunal has determined that interest should be based on
the respondent’s borrowing rate, it should also consider whether
53. That is, in theory, as a borrower’s solvency deteriorates, the rate at which it can
borrow would increase, but in practice, lenders may simply be unwilling to lend at some point.
A lender who lends on a rolling short-term basis is less exposed to this risk because it can
simply not roll over the debt as the borrower’s solvency deteriorates.
54. The long-term rate at the start of the loan reflects market expectation of the evolution
of short-term interest rates over the course of the loan. This happens because for market
participants to lend freely at the long-term rate, they should be indifferent between extending a
loan at a fixed, long-term rate and extending a series of short-term loans. Therefore, if shortterm rates rise above the levels expected at inception, a floating-rate loan would accumulate
more interest than the fixed-rate loan, and vice versa if short-term rates rise fall below
expected levels. However, because long-term rates incorporate a premium for bearing interest
rate risk (as discussed above), on average awarding interest at long-term rates results in higher
pre-award interest than applying short-term rates.
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awards have favorable or unfavorable credit characteristics relative to
the benchmark chosen. These differences are likely to be relatively
small. Examples include differences in priority or costs of
enforcement or collection.
4. Step # 4: Address Claims of Additional Harm Caused by Delay in
Payment
As a final step, tribunals should address any claims for
additional damages suffered based on the claimant’s cost of financing,
be it the cost of debt, the cost of equity, or the cost of capital. The
claimant may argue that the inability to access the award amount at
the date of the breach: 1) has caused the claimant to raise financing at
some cost that would not have been incurred if the funds had been
made immediately available, or 2), has prevented the claimant from
pursuing profitable investment opportunities, or 3) has prevented the
claimant from repaying outstanding loans taken to finance the asset
that was expropriated or impaired by respondent’s breach. As general
theories of pre-award interest, such arguments are inconsistent with
economic principles of compensation. In specific circumstances, the
arguments may be economically sensible and the tribunal can address
the specific facts separately and make a decision based on evidence
that links those facts to specific harm to the claimant.
The claim that the respondent’s actions left the claimant without
the cash necessary to fund attractive investments, so instead the
claimant borrowed and paid a relatively high interest rate on loans,
does not satisfy the basic principle of aligning risk and return. If the
claimant had a higher borrowing cost than the respondent, and
borrowed at that higher cost to finance its operations/investments,
then the operations/investments must have had a higher risk than the
amounts owed by the respondent. It does not mean that the claimant
has paid too much in interest.
In other words, funds always have a cost. It is mistaken to argue
that the prompt payment of compensation from the respondent would
have deprived the claimant of the need to incur a cost of funds. If the
respondent had harmed the claimant by US$100, and had immediately
reimbursed the claimant with a payment of US$100 on the date of
breach, then the US$100 would still have had its own implicit cost of
funds before the claimant redirected it to the alleged attractive
investment. The cost of funds associated with the hypothetical
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US$100 cash compensation should have been the same as on any
external loan that the claimant actually undertook.
A similar, related argument made by the claimants is that the
respondent’s actions prevented the claimant from obtaining a return
on the investment, so that pre-award interest should be calculated at
the project’s cost of capital for the award to put the claimant in the
position they would have achieved absent the breach.55 The problem
with this logic is readily apparent when considering the principle of
aligning risk and return. The cost of capital represents the expected
rate an investor earns in exchange for bearing the risk of earning
more or less than a particular target, including the possibility of
actually experiencing a loss. The cost of capital is by no means a
certain return.56 Awarding such a return is inappropriate if the alleged
violation has itself deprived the claimant of the risk associated with
an asset or business.57
Suppose that the respondent has expropriated an asset worth
US$100 on the valuation date, and that the cost of capital for that
asset would have been 15%. Suppose that the pre-award interest
covers one year so that a claim for the cost of capital would bring the
value of the award to US$115 in one year.58 If the expropriation has
deprived the claimant of the risk associated with the asset, then it
would be inappropriate to award the claimant the 15% return, which
includes compensation for risk not borne. If we know with certainty
that the respondent would never default, then an investor would use a
risk-free rate to estimate the fair market value of an award of US$115
in one year. If the risk-free rate is only 4%, then the FMV of the
award would be US$110.60 as of the date of valuation.59 Losing
US$100 in FMV, the claimant would in effect receive an award with
an FMV that is US$10.60 higher. One can conclude that awarding the
cost of capital does not respect the principle of FMV in this case.

55. See, e.g., Abdala et al., supra note 40.
56. To illustrate this point, suppose that an investor makes such a risky investment
multiple times. On average, the return would be the cost of capital, but in each individual case,
the return could be higher than the average, sometimes it would be below the average, and in
some instances the investor would actually experience a loss.
57. See, e.g., Aaron Dolgoff & Tiago Duarte-Silva, Prejudgment Interest and the Fallacy
of the Invalid Round Trip, 10 World Arb. & Mediation Rev. 429 (2016).
58. $100 1.15 $115.
59. $115/1.04 $110.6.
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Commentators have noted a pernicious element to applying the
cost of capital, in that high-risk assets would receive larger amounts
of pre-award interest even if the breach prevented the claimant from
incurring any further business risk in connection with the asset.60
Applying the cost of capital indirectly re-inserts into the equation a
risk of loss that the breach actually removed.61 The same principle
implies that it is inappropriate to award pre-award interest based on
the expected return on other investments that the claimant has not
made, such as the overall stock market: it would provide
compensation for a risk that claimant has not borne.62 An ex-post
compensation standard explicitly rewards the claimant for the
resolution of risk that the claimant did not actually bear after the date
of breach, yet tribunals often hesitate to impose such a standard unless
they make specific findings of a willful or flagrant violation.
Moreover, if the claimant had a lucrative investment
opportunity, it should have been able to finance it at whatever market
rate was appropriate for the risk of that investment. As long as the
claimant had access to funding sources, which is the typical case for a
commercial entity, the delay in receiving compensation should not
have prevented it from undertaking attractive investments, and
therefore should not have caused any harm. In special cases when the
claimant could not access external financing, the claimant could bring
evidence of specific investment opportunities that it would have
pursued but for the lack of financing. If the tribunal found the
evidence sufficient to support a claim for damages under the relevant
legal standards, the tribunal could grant an award for the proven loss
of opportunity.
The third argument for using the claimant’s cost of funds – that
the expropriation denied the claimant the funds to repay an
outstanding loan taken to finance the asset that was expropriated or
impaired by the respondent’s breach – has its own problems. First, it
assumes that the claimant cannot have repaid or refinanced the loan
60. See Dolgoff & Duarte-Silva, supra note 62, at 443.
61. See William B. Tye, Stephen H Kalos, & A. Lawrence Kolbe, How to Value a Lost
Opportunity: Defining and Measuring Damages from Market Foreclosure, 17 Res. in L. &
Econ. 83 (1995) (providing a discussion of related economic arguments).
62. See Thierry J. Sénéchal & John Y. Gotanda, Interest as Damages, 47 Colum J.
Transnat’l L. 491 (2009) (describing a proposal to award an interest rate that includes the
expected return on the overall stock market).
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once the asset was lost. But if that is the case, then the claimant
should be able to identify and measure the additional cost,
demonstrate that it could not have been avoided through mitigation,
and claim it directly as an additional element of damages. The
associated costs would form part of the damages to which a tribunal
should apply pre-award interest. Second, it assumes that the
respondent’s borrowing rate is lower than the interest rate on the
underlying loan on the asset so that the respondent’s borrowing rate
would fail to cover the loan costs prior to the award.
In summary, arguments based on the claimant’s cost of financing
generally do not hold because the typical claimant has access to wellfunctioning financial markets.63 It can therefore fund investment
opportunities on FMV terms, neither foregoing potentially profitable
investments nor paying above-market financing costs to fund them.
However, some claimants may lack access to markets, or market
frictions may make external funding more expensive than their own
funds. Resulting losses may be compensable under such specific
circumstances and the tribunal can evaluate the factual evidence and
determine whether it meets the legal standard necessary to award
damages. Such an inquiry is similar to that conducted to award other
types of damages.
C. Post-Award Interest
Post-award interest does not confront the question of the
allocation of litigation risk. Once the award is established, the
claimant is formally a creditor to the respondent and should receive a
rate of interest commensurate with the post-award risks. The starting
point should be the respondent’s borrowing rate. The tribunal,
however, should consider making the adjustments we outlined earlier
to reflect substantive differences, if any, in the risk of default or the
cost of enforcement of an award compared to those reflected in the
respondent’s benchmark borrowing rate. In doing so, the post-award
interest preserves the FMV of the award over time and captures the
risks of collection. It would also remove incentives for the respondent
to delay payment and use the award debt as a source of cheap
financing.
63. See Colón & Knoll, Prejudgment Interest, supra note 30, at 4-6 (providing a
summary of economic arguments against rates based on claimant’s cost of funds).
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III. CONCLUSION
We propose a framework based on economic principles that
tribunals and experts can apply to determine the correct rates for preand post- award interest. We propose that a generally applicable preaward interest rate is either the risk-free rate or a rate that reflects the
respondent’s risk of default, with the choice depending on whether
the tribunal establishes that liability begins at the date of the award or
at the date of the breach respectively. In either alternative, the
appropriate economic standard is fair market value and the
appropriate rate should reflect the time value of money and the risks
that the tribunal deems compensable. Post-award interest accrues after
liability is established, and therefore only a rate that reflects
respondent’s risk of default is relevant. Where specific circumstances
affect the claimant’s financial position or the markets in which it can
obtain financing, our framework suggests that the claimant should
provide evidence of such additional harm. The tribunal can then
evaluate that evidence as a separate head of damages. Our framework
identifies economically principled choices and provides economic
guidance for tribunals’ interpretation of the economic aspects of the
contract, treaty, or law at issue.

